In this paper, we investigate both theoretically and empirically the e¤ects of free trade agreements (FTAs) on the tari¤s of non-member countries. Our theoretical framework draws on the comparative advantage based trade model of Horn, Maggi, and Staiger (2010) . In this model, since marginal costs of production are increasing with output, if a few countries form an FTA and start trading more with each other, they simultaneously become less willing to export to rest of the world -a phenomenon we call external trade diversion. Such diversion reduces the ability and the incentive of non-member countries to manipulate their terms of trade, a mechanism that induces them to lower their tari¤s on FTA members. We provide an empirical con…rmation of this insight using industrylevel bilateral trade data for 192 importing and 253 exporting countries, along with the information on all FTAs formed in the world during 1989-2011. Our analysis provides a rather convincing veri…cation of the terms of trade theory since the formation of an FTA between a few countries can be reasonably interpreted as an exogenous event from the perspective of the rest of the world.
Introduction
Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are a feature of the global trade policy landscape like never before. Much attention has been devoted to how such trade agreements might a¤ect tari¤ policies of member countries towards not only each other but also non-members. However, to the best of our knowledge, we know little about whether and how the formation of PTAs a¤ects the trade policies of non-member countries. In fact, in both theoretical and empirical analyses of PTAs, it is customary to either completely ignore the trade policies of non-members or assume that they are una¤ected by PTA formation. For reasons we explain below, this is an important omission from a conceptual as well as a practical perspective. In this paper, we investigate both theoretically and empirically the e¤ects of free trade agreements (FTAs) -the most commonly occurring type of PTA -on the tari¤s of non-member countries. Our empirical work is motivated by a simple theoretical framework based on Horn, Maggi, and Staiger (2010) .
Existing literature has shown that the formation of an FTA can induce member countries to lower their tari¤s on non-members: this is the so called tari¤ complementarity e¤ect (Bagwell and Staiger, 1997) . The intuition underlying this surprising e¤ect is quite robust and clean.
As Maggi (2014) notes, if two countries possessing market power sign an FTA, they start to import more from each other and less from non-members and this trade diversion reduces their incentives to manipulate their terms of trade vis-a-vis non-members, which ultimately results in lower external tari¤s on their part. Empirical support for the tari¤ complementarity result has been provided by Estevadeordal, Freund, and Ornelas (2008) , Calvo-Pardo, Freund, and Ornelas (2009), and Bohara, Gawande, and Sanguinetti (2004) .
The key insight underlying our paper is that the logic underlying the tari¤ complementarity e¤ect also ought to apply to the optimal tari¤s of non-member countries provided they possess the ability to in ‡uence their terms of trade. In a world with increasing production costs, if two countries undertake bilateral trade liberalization via an FTA their mutual trade increases while their exports to other countries fall. This change in the pattern of international trade reduces the ability and the incentive of non-member countries to manipulate their terms of trade viz-aviz FTA members, a mechanism that ought to induce non-members to voluntarily lower their tari¤s on FTA members. To the best of our knowledge, this insight regarding the e¤ect of FTAs on tari¤s of non-member countries has been generally overlooked in the literature.
In this paper, we …rst formally develop this insight in a simple economic framework based on Horn, Maggi, and Staiger (2010) and then provide empirical evidence in its support. The theoretical framework is a classical partial equilibrium set-up comprising an arbitrary number (n) of countries who produce a single numeraire good v 0 and n non-numeraire goods, where the marginal cost of production of each non-numeraire good increases with output. The pattern of comparative advantage is such that each country exports a unique good to all its trading partners, i.e., the underlying trade pattern is one of competing importers. An important feature of this economic framework is that if two countries liberalize trade towards one another, they import more from each other but simultaneously start exporting less of their comparative advantage good to the rest of the world -a phenomenon we call external trade diversion.
We …rst derive optimal tari¤s in the absence of any trade agreement and then consider how the formation of an FTA amongst m countries, m < n, a¤ects the tari¤s of a typical non-member country. We show that the export supply elasticities facing non-member countries increase with the size of the FTA (as measured by the number of FTA partners m) as well as the external tari¤ preference margin enjoyed by a typical FTA member. Thus, FTAs reduce export supply elasticities facing non-member countries, inducing them to lower their tari¤s.
However, bringing this prediction directly to the data is problematic because we do not observe variation in export supply elasticities across countries and industries over time. Our empirical framework is based on another related prediction of the model which links unobservable changes in export supply elasticities to observable changes in trade ‡ows between FTA member countries. Speci…cally, the model predicts that the increase in the export supply elasticities of non-members is larger and the reduction in their external tari¤s is deeper when the e¤ect of an FTA on preferential trade between member countries is larger. To operationalize this prediction, for every country in our sample we construct a measure of a trade-weighted average change in preferential trade ‡ows of its main trade partners. This measure, which we call preferential export share, has a strong theoretical relationship to export supply elasticities and the data reveals that it indeed re ‡ects the variation in elasticities over time. In particular, when we split our sample of countries into two halves by time we …nd that an increase in the preferential export share of a country's average partner between the two periods is associated with an increase in its export supply elasticity, estimated using the Broda and Weinstein (2006) methodology.
Building on the insights of the model, we set out to empirically investigate whether countries indeed adjust trade policies in response to FTA formation by other countries. Our main empirical focus is on the relationship between changes in MFN tari¤ rates of countries and preferential export shares. To construct a measure of the annual change in the preferential export share of a country's average trade partner, we use industry-level bilateral trade data for 192 importing and 253 exporting countries, along with the information on all FTAs formed between 1989 and 2011.
Our estimation results support the external trade diversion hypothesis. We …nd that the formation of an FTA by a group of countries and the associated increase in the share of trade between them induces other countries to lower their MFN tari¤s. The results are both statistically signi…cant and economically sizable. For example, in our benchmark speci…cation, if a country's preferential exports increase by 10% as a result of a new FTA, and its share in imports of another non-member country is 10%, the latter reduces its MFN tari¤ by 0.08 percentage points. This result is remarkably robust to the inclusion of a broad set of …xed e¤ects, including country-year and country-industry …xed e¤ects. Moreover, the e¤ect is the most pronounced for trade-creating FTAs which increase the share of preferential trade between members and, according to the theory, result in greater increase in the export supply elasticities for non-members.
We pay close attention to endogeneity issues and use several instrumental variables strategies to determine whether the e¤ect of FTAs on tari¤s of non-member countries is causal. The …rst endogeneity concern arises from the simultaneity between MFN tari¤s and import shares. We address this problem by instrumenting for a country's export pattern using a geography-based gravity model in the spirit of Frankel and Romer (1999) . The second source of endogeneity is the presence of omitted variables which could a¤ect trade ‡ows between FTA member countries for reasons unrelated to agreement formation. In order to better isolate variation in preferential trade shares which is due to the e¤ect of preferential trade agreements, we instrument preferential export shares with pre-determined geographic variables using the insights of Baier and Bergstrand (2004) . Overall, our IV estimates point to an even stronger external trade diversion e¤ect of FTAs. Moreover, the dynamics of the e¤ect are also consistent with our expectations.
In particular, we …nd external trade diversion to be the strongest in the second and the third years of FTA implementation -the period of the most intense trade liberalization for most agreements -but not in the subsequent years when the e¤ects of preferential liberalization on trade have basically been exhausted. Also, the e¤ect of FTAs on tari¤s of non-members is insigni…cant in the …rst year, suggesting that countries do not immediately adjust their trade policies to term-of-trade shocks.
The policy implications of our results are clear as well as important. If the formation of FTAs can cause trade liberalization to spillover to excluded countries, an important welfare gain accruing from their formation has been ignored thus far in not just the academic literature but also in policy analysis. The literature addressing whether FTAs are building or stumbling blocs for further liberalization in the world economy has tended to focus primarily on the e¤ects FTAs have on the incentives for further liberalization of members -see, for example, Krishna (1998) and Bagwell and Staiger (1997) . Our analysis shows that the scope of this line of inquiry needs to be broadened to also include the e¤ects that FTAs might have on the policies of non-member countries.
Terms of trade e¤ects plays a central role in our analysis, and the results of our study complement the empirical research investigating the role terms of trade motives play in determining trade policy. Broda, Limão, and Weinstein (2008) con…rm that non-WTO countries indeed manipulate their terms of trade by setting higher tari¤s on goods that are supplied inelastically.
Several recent studies identify the terms of trade e¤ect from trade policy re-negotiations imposed by multilateral agreements. Bagwell and Staiger (2011) focus on changes in tari¤ rates resulting from a country's accession to the WTO and Ludema and Mayda (2013) examine variation in MFN tari¤s resulting from the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. In line with the predictions of the terms of trade theory, both studies …nd that countries reduce tari¤s to a deeper degree in industries in which they have greater market power. Using data on import tari¤s imposed by the United States on 49 countries during 1997-2006 under its anti-dumping and safeguard laws duties, Bown and Crowley (2013) provide an empirical con…rmation of the managed trade theory of Bagwell and Staiger (1990) in which countries play a repeated game and any trade agreement between them has to be self-enforcing. Our paper contributes to this literature by identifying FTAs as a source of exogenous shocks to the terms of trade of all non-members countries. We demonstrate that non-member countries reduce their MFN tari¤s in response to negative terms of trade shocks associated with FTAs. In a sense, our analysis provides perhaps one of the cleanest tests of the terms of trade theory since the formation of an FTA between a few countries can be reasonably interpreted as an exogenous event from the perspective of the rest of the world. Thus, our empirical results provide a rather novel con…rmation of the terms of trade theory.
Theoretical model
Our motivating economic framework is a suitably adapted version of the two-country model of Horn, Maggi, and Staiger (2010) . We consider a perfectly competitive world comprising n large countries that produce n (non-numeraire) goods and a single numeraire good v 0 . We …rst describe the underlying economic structure and then derive optimal tari¤s in the absence as well as the presence of a free trade agreement (FTA) comprising of an arbitrary number of countries.
On the demand side, the representative citizen's utility function is given by:
where v is the consumption vector for the n non-numeraire goods, v 0 denotes the consumption of the numeraire good. We assume u(v) is quadratic and additively separable in the three non-numeraire goods so that demand for good g in country z is given by d a comparative disadvantage in the remaining n 1 goods. Thus, there are n 1 competing importers for each non-numeraire good. Country z's producer surplus in good g is easily calculated:
As a representative scenario for all goods and countries, consider good g z (i.e. the good in which country z has a comparative advantage). Let t g z be the MFN tari¤ imposed by country z on its imports of good g.
2 Given that all countries are large, world price of good g depends on the tari¤s of all importing countries but to simplify notation we suppress the dependence of prices on tari¤s and simply denote the price of good g in country z by p g z .
Since country z imposes no tari¤ on good g z , the consumer and producer prices of good g z in country z are equal:
Similarly, as there is no domestic taxation of the import competing sectors, producer and consumer prices are also equal: q g z = p g z , where g 6 = g z . Ruling out prohibitive tari¤s yields the following no-arbitrage conditions for good g z in importing country c:
Let m gz c be the imports of good g z by country c:
Similarly, let x gz z denote country z's exports of good g z to country c:
Market clearing for good g z requires that country z's export to country c equals the imports of that country:
Country c's welfare is de…ned as the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus, and tari¤ revenue over all goods:
In the absence of any trade agreement, each country chooses its tari¤s to maximize its welfare. To derive optimal tari¤s, we follow the approach of Feenstra (2004) and Broda, Limão, and Weinstein (2008) . Consider country c's tari¤ problem for good g z . Di¤erentiating w c with respect to t gz c , we obtain: @w c @t towards one another, they import more from each other and start exporting less to the other countries owing to the fact that the marginal cost of production is increasing -a phenomenon we call external trade diversion. As we will see below, this reduction in the volume of exports of members to excluded countries has implications for their optimal tari¤s.
It is immediate from (14) that the formation of an FTA a¤ects country z's export supply function through two key channels: the size of the FTA (as measured by the number of FTA partners m) and the external tari¤ preference margin ' gz ext enjoyed by members within an FTA relative to tari¤s they face in non-member countries, where ' Given the export supply function above, the export supply elasticity " gz c faced by nonmember country c can be calculated as follows:
Note that the export supply elasticity " 
It also proves useful to consider how the two main attributes of an FTA (i.e. m and ' gz ext ) a¤ect its overall trade pattern. Suppose country z negotiates an FTA with m countries. The share of country z's exports of good g z ‡owing to its m FTA partners equals:
We refer to P XS zgz as country z's preferential export share.
In the absence of any FTA (which we denote as regime ), due to symmetry, the share of country z's exports of good g z ‡owing to any m countries is P XS zgz ( ) = m n 1 . In other words, when country z is not a participant in any FTA, the share of its exports going to any m countries equals P XS zgz ( ).
Following the formation of the FTA, it is straightforward to show that preferential export share of country z in good g z becomes: From here on, we utilize parameters m and ' gz ext to capture changes in both the preferential export share and the export supply elasticity. The change in the preferential export share of country z due to the formation of an FTA equals:
Note that for any given FTA of size m, the greater the external tari¤ preference margin, the larger the increase in the preferential export share:
5 A similar analysis holds for country c's optimal tari¤.
Using (13) and (15), non-member country c's optimal tari¤ when country z forms an FTA with m other countries is equal to:
It is immediate from above that the tari¤s imposed by di¤erent non-member countries on the same good are strategic complements in our model:
The intuition for why tari¤s of di¤erent countries end up being strategic complements is that an increase in the tari¤ t gz c increases the volume of country z's exports to country c thereby increasing the latter's ability to manipulate its terms of trade.
Note that as the preferential export share rises either due to an increase in the size of the FTA (m) or due to its preference margin (' gz ext ), the external trade diversion caused by the FTA induces the non-member country to lower its tari¤s on members: 
The optimal pre-FTA MFN tari¤ of country c can be found by setting ' gz ext = 0 in (21), which yields:
Using (21) and (24), we can directly calculate the change in the optimal MFN tari¤ of nonmember country c as a function of m and ' Proposition 1: The larger the increase in preferential export share of FTA member countries, the greater the reduction in the external tari¤s of non-member countries.
The intuition for this proposition is clear: the greater the degree of external trade diversion caused by an FTA, the lower incentives of non-members to manipulate their terms of trade via import tari¤s. Proposition 2 in the Appendix B shows that the same result holds under a general demand and supply structure as long as the inverse supply function is log-concave.
3 Empirical model and data
Empirical model
The theoretical model illustrates the relationship between FTA formation and the change in import tari¤s of excluded countries. In general, the optimal import tari¤ of country c for industry i in year t is equal to the inverse of the export supply elasticity:
When a group of countries form an FTA, it re-directs their trade ‡ows towards member countries, reducing their export supply to the rest of the world. The resulting increase in " cit faced by all non-member countries will stimulate a reduction in their import tari¤s. Thus, the empirical model should relate changes in import tari¤s to changes in the export supply elasticities caused by trade agreements of other countries. However, a direct test of this relationship requires information on product-speci…c changes in export supply elasticities of a country attributable to formation of trade agreements between its partners, which is unobservable: the existing empirical methods for estimating export supply elasticities at the product level rely on time variation to identify structural parameters and do not allow estimating changes in " cit over time.
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To deal with this problem, our main empirical test is based on Proposition 1 which builds a theoretical relationship from unobservable changes in elasticities to observable changes in trade shares. Intuitively, a greater increase in trade between FTA member countries implies stronger external trade diversion and larger increase in " cit , reducing welfare-maximizing tari¤s by all non-member countries. Using this insight, the simplest structure to study the relationship between FTA formation and MFN tari¤s of excluded countries is
where M F N cit is the annual change in the MFN tari¤ rate of country c for industry i in time t and P XS cit is the annual change in the preferential export share of country c's average trade partner. The main explanatory variable is lagged by one period in order to minimize any possible simultaneity problem. Given that each country has multiple trading partners, we construct P XS cit as a weighted average of preferential exports of country c's partners using their import shares as weights:
where imp_share cpi is the sample-average share of country p in total imports of industry i by country c, exp_share pjit is the share of country p's exports of good i to country j, F T A pjt is a binary variable which takes the value of one if countries p and j have an FTA in year t and zero otherwise, and P REF _SHARE pit is the share of country p's exports of good i to its FTA 7 See Hillberry and Hummels (2013) for the overview of the literature on the estimation of import demand and export supply elasticities.
partner countries excluding c. Note that import shares, used as weights in equation (26), are constructed as averages over the entire sample period for each country-pair and industry. This is done in order to reduce the measurement error and to bring the empirical speci…cation closer to the theory, which predicts that the e¤ect of trade agreements operates through changes in preferential export share of a country's trade partners. Therefore, the variation in P XS measure over time for each country-industry pair is driven only by the variation in preferential export share of a country's trade partners rather than by the variation in its own trade structure.
In equation (25) 
where F T A (T ) pjt is a binary variable which takes the value of one if an FTA between countries p and j was established in year (t T ) and T x t = (x t x t T ). Thus, for all countries which formed FTAs with country p in year (t T ), P REF _SHARE (T ) pit 1 will measure the change in the share of those countries in total exports of industry i by country p between years (t 1) and (t T 1). The e¤ect of agreements formed more than …ve years ago is combined into one general category P XS (T = 6) cit 1 .
Speci…cation (27) is still too parsimonious, however, and disregards other determinants of a country's trade policy which may be related to its own or its partners'trade structure. Our three-dimensional panel enables us to use a variety of …xed e¤ects to control for a wide array of omitted variables. Incorporating those …xed e¤ects in model (27) we obtain:
The country year …xed e¤ect ct will absorb not only inherent country characteristics that do not vary over the sample period, such as geographic, political and institutional factors, but also the e¤ect of time-varying country characteristics on trade policy changes. This includes general episodes of country-speci…c trade liberalization, accession to the WTO and regional trade agreements, changes in …scal and monetary policies, variation in exchange rates and balance of payments, and other macroeconomic characteristics that a¤ect general changes in tari¤ policies in speci…c countries and periods. Country industry …xed e¤ects ci will control for economic and political factors that may a¤ect the average changes in the level of protection in di¤erent industries within a country. In particular, ci will capture a government's potential reluctance to liberalize trade in certain sensitive industries and the possibility for more rapid tari¤ reductions in other industries.
A concern remains that some factors with the country industry time variation may be correlated with both MFN tari¤s and the preferential trade structure of a country's trade partners. One of those factors, identi…ed in the previous literature, is reciprocity in trade negotiations. Reciprocity is an important principle of the WTO and since our sample period covers the Uruguay round of tari¤ cuts it may play an important role in our empirical analysis.
In the presence of reciprocal tari¤ negotiations, a reduction in the MFN tari¤ by a country will a¤ect both the MFN tari¤s of its trade partners and the share of its preferential exports in the following period, causing a simultaneity problem in equation (29). Following Limão (2006), we address it by introducing the market access control variable:
The expression in brackets is the weighted average change in the MFN tari¤s of country p across all product lines n, which is then averaged across all exporters p of product i to country c. Since the GATT principle supplier rule states that countries negotiate only with their top exporters, the latter aggregation is performed only over the top …ve main suppliers of product i to country c.
Addressing endogeneity issues
Key to our identi…cation strategy is that the decision to form an FTA is independent of future changes in trade policies by other countries. 8 However, import shares and preferential export shares, used in the construction of our main explanatory variables, may not be fully exogenous.
Although the broad set of …xed e¤ects allows to control for many possible unobservables and remove most of the omitted variables, this does not resolve all potential endogeneity issues with various components of the explanatory variables. In this section we …rst discuss identi…cation problems associated with import shares, and then focus on endogeneity of preferential export shares.
A potential threat with using import shares as weights in the construction of P XS (T )
variables is that imports may be simultaneously determined with import tari¤s. This concern would be even more serious if reductions in import tari¤s have di¤erential impact on imports from partners with di¤erent preferences for regional trade liberalization. For example, if countries that are more actively involved in preferential trade bene…t more from trade liberalization by others, than a reduction in import tari¤s will increase the share of imports from those countries, thus raising the value of our explanatory variables and causing simultaneity bias in T .
Although averaging import shares over time will reduce the simultaneity problem, it will not resolve it completely. Another concern with using import shares is that they may partially o¤set the e¤ect of FTA on preferential export shares. If an FTA between a pair of countries redirects their exports from third countries to each other's markets, as the theory predicts, an increase in preferential export shares of the FTA member countries will be combined with a decrease in import shares of other countries from that FTA, reducing the value of P XS (T )
and causing a bias in the estimates.
We address the endogeneity of import shares with the instrumental variable strategy similar to Do and Levchenko (2007) , which extends the methodology of Frankel and Romer (1999) to industry-level data. Frankel and Romer (1999) use the gravity model to predict the observed trade ‡ows between a pair of countries using their pre-determined geographic characteristics such as distance, population and other standard covariates of trade costs used in the gravity models. These are reasonable instruments because on one hand they are powerful determinants of trade ‡ows, as the gravity literature demonstrates, 9 and on the other it is di¢ cult to think of any reasons for why country's geographic characteristics could a¤ect product-speci…c tari¤ changes other than through trade ‡ows. Since we need to instrument import shares at the industry level, we allow the coe¢ cients on the covariates in the gravity model to vary across industries, as in Do and Levchenko (2007) . This approach is based on the assumption that trade volumes respond di¤erently to geographic characteristics in di¤erent industries, which is supported by the data: 70% of variation in trade values predicted by the model comes from within country-pair-year cells, close to 59% observed in the data. Following this methodology,
we obtain predicted values of trade ‡ows between every country pair for every industry and use them to calculate the predicted "natural"import shares, \ imp_share cpi . Using these values, we form the following measures
These variables isolate variation in import shares stemming from changes in either expected MFN tari¤ changes or preferential trade shares of partner countries. Therefore, as long
Another identi…cation issue with equation (29) relates to preferential export shares used in the construction of the main explanatory variables. The concern here is that these shares are used as proxies for unobservable changes in export supply elasticities. The theoretical model predicts that FTAs a¤ect both the export supply elasticities and the preferential export shares positively, so that changes in the latter can be used to infer changes in the former. However, a change in the share of a country's exports to its FTA trade partners is an imperfect measure of a change in the export supply elasticity as trade shares may vary for a variety of reasons unrelated to the trade agreement and to the export supply elasticity faced by other countries.
Therefore, identi…cation of the e¤ect of trade agreements on trade policies of excluded countries in model (29) rests on two assumptions. First, the variation in preferential export shares must to some extent be driven by changes in the export supply elasticities. Second, the remaining variation in preferential export share must be unrelated to the error term in (29).
In the Appendix C we provide some evidence in support of the …rst assumption. Using Feenstra (1994) methodology, we estimate the ROW export supply elasticity for every country countries, log of population, log of land size, landlock and common border indicators, and the interactions of all of the above variables with the common border dummy variable. The F-statistics on these terms in the log of imports regression are highly signi…cant for all industries and the average R-squared is 0.2.
and industry for two time periods : 1988-2001 and 2002-2011 . Consistent with our theory, we …nd a positive and statistically signi…cant relationship between changes in the export supply elasticities and changes in preferential export shares over these two time periods.
Although the variation in preferential export shares is consistent with the terms of trade variation, large measurement error may lead to attenuation bias in T estimates. Moreover, changes in preferential export shares and MFN tari¤s of third countries may be determined by some common shocks. Addressing these endogeneity concerns requires isolating variation in preferential export shares which is due to the e¤ect of a trade agreement on trade ‡ows between member countries. To construct such instruments we use the insights of Baier and Bergstrand (2004) who develop a general equilibrium model of trade to determine which economic characteristics are associated with stronger trade creation forces of regional trade agreements. Baier and Bergstrand found that FTAs lead to more trade between member countries and generate stronger welfare gains if the member countries are: closer to each other, more remote from the rest of the world, larger in size, and similar in size (as measured by population). With these geographic variables we predict the e¤ect of an FTA on trade ‡ows between members and obtain a measure of predicted changes in preferential trade shares which are plausibly independent from other determinants of trade policies of non-member countries. Using …tted values for changes in preferential trade shares obtained from this model, we construct the second set of instruments for changes in trade-weighted preferential export shares:
These instruments are functions of pre-determined geographic characteristics of a country's trade partners and FTA dummy variables and provide consistent estimates under the condition that the decision of a pair of third countries to form an FTA is independent of the error term in (29). As an additional set of instruments, IV 3 (T ), we also use the (import-weighted) change in preferential export share predicted by di¤erences in capital and skilled labor endowments of the FTA member countries. Appendix D lays out the details of the construction of our instruments.
Data
The bilateral trade data for this project are taken from the World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) database, maintained by the World Bank, and cover the time period from 1989 to 2011.
The data that we use to construct trade share variables is a four-dimensional unbalanced panel of 192 importing countries, 253 exporting countries, 98 2-digit HS industries and 22 years. 10 The binary variable that measures the presence or absence of an FTA in a given year was constructed for all pairs of countries in our sample using the WTO database on Regional Trade Agreements which includes information on the date of noti…cation and the date when the agreement entered into force. We record FTA as being formed in year t if it came into force between July of (t 1) and June of t. Since the membership structure of some FTAs vary over time and the WTO database does not always keep track of those changes, the data on bilateral FTA structure was complemented with information from other sources such as o¢ cial web sites of these agreements. The resulting database covers all complete FTAs that were formed between 1989 and 2011 and includes 2; 513 country pairs trading under an FTA clause in 2011, or 6:6% of all country-pairs in our sample. Without information on coverage of each FTA, we assume that FTAs apply to trade in all industries between their members.
Using equation (28) and the data on bilateral trade ‡ows and FTA membership, we construct six measures for changes in preferential export shares of an average partner for every country, industry, and year. We combine this information on preferential trade of an average partner country with the MFN and preferential tari¤ data from the WITS. Table 1 Internationales (CEPII). This database contains information on bilateral distance between each pair of countries, land size of each country, and information on whether two countries are landlocked and share a border. The data on population are taken from the Penn World Tables. 10 We exclude China from the sample because China's increasing ability to penetrate other markets results in a reduction in trade shares between members of most FTAs. However, keeping China in the sample does not materially a¤ect our results, as we show in the robustness section. Table 2 presents OLS estimation results for equation (29) . All standard errors are clustered at country-product level to correct for serial correlation in the error term. The …rst column reports the estimates for the most basic speci…cation and columns (2)-(6) add progressively more …xed e¤ects and controls. Overall, an increase in preferential exports of a product by a country's trade partners is associated with a subsequent reduction in its MFN tari¤s. The results in our most preferred speci…cation with country-year and country-industry …xed e¤ects in column (6) suggest that the reductions in MFN tari¤s peak in the second year after implementation of an agreement and then fall gradually over the next three years. The coe¢ cients on P XS (T ) are statistically signi…cant in the …rst three years of FTA formation and remain negative but insigni…cant in the following two years. It should be noted that this result is robust to the inclusion of various …xed e¤ects and the magnitude of the coe¢ cients is fairly stable across speci…cations. Even the most stringent speci…cation with country-industry, country-year, and industry-year …xed e¤ects in column (5) yields similar estimates to speci…cation with countryyear e¤ects in column (2).
Results

Baseline results
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The estimates from Table 2 In this section we present the results for equation (29) with changes in partner countries' preferential export shares calculated separately for positive and negative changes:
The variable P XS (T ) P is analogous to (28) but is calculated only for those FTA country pairs and industries for which trade agreements resulted in greater preferential shares. If only trade-creating FTAs lead to a long-run increase in the export supply elasticity, as the theory predicts, then we would expect the coe¢ cients on P XS (T ) P to be negative and larger in absolute value that the coe¢ cients on P XS (T ) N .
Consistently with our expectations, results in Table 3 show that the relationship between FTA formation and tari¤ reductions by non-members is stronger in those cases when FTA triggered an increase in the share of preferential trade between member countries. While trade agreements that result in lower trade shares between members have no statistically signi…cant e¤ect on tari¤s of excluded countries, the e¤ect of trade-creating FTAs is nearly twice as strong as that estimated previously for all agreements pooled together. The estimates in column (3) imply that if 10% of a country's imports is coming from a partner which experienced a 10% increase in preferential exports, the imports tari¤ of the former country will fall by almost 0:18 percentage points in three years following formation of the agreement (0:095 + 0:032 + 0:053).
The result that only trade-creating FTAs are associated with tari¤ cuts by non-members is consistent with Proposition 1 which states that the e¤ect of a trade agreement on export supply elasticity is stronger when the increase in the volume of trade between member countries is larger. The …nding that not all FTAs lead to trade policy adjustments by outside countries also points to the importance of isolating the e¤ect of FTAs on preferential export shares from other in ‡uences.
Instrumental variable results
As discussed in Section 3.2, both import shares and preferential export shares can be endogenous in equation (29) . In this section we explore the instrumental variable strategy to estimate (29) which relies on the weaker identi…cation assumption than the OLS, speci…cally that only the decision to form an FTA is exogenous to future tari¤ changes by other countries.
We begin our analysis by addressing the endogeneity issue of import shares, which we use as weights in (26) to construct changes in preferential exports for an average trade partner. Recall from Section 3.2 that the two main concerns with import shares are their negative relationship with preferential export shares and the reverse causality from changes in import tari¤s. Using instruments IV 1 (T ), constructed with import shares predicted by the gravity model, would allow us to obtain estimates of T which are based on the variation in import shares arising from geographical determinants of trade ‡ows and are thus free from any policy in ‡uences.
The estimates with IV 1 (T ) instruments are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 .
The instruments perform well in the …rst stage of the estimation procedure. The t-statistics from the test of the signi…cance of IV 1 (T ) in the …rst stage regression of P XS (T ) range from 7:5 for T = 1 to 22:3 for T 6. Since we have multiple endogenous variables, we use AngristPischke statistics to assess the strength of our instruments (Angrist and Pischke, 2009 ). The results, reported in the bottom of Table 4 , indicate that weak instruments is unlikely to be a problem. We also report the conventional F-statistics for instrument exclusion and they vary from 6:81 for T = 1 to 32:79 for T 6. 13 The second stage estimates are consistent with the main …ndings of the previous sections. As shown, all coe¢ cients are negative and three of them are statistically signi…cant, indicating that FTAs lead to tari¤ reductions by non-members. Table 4 reveals two important di¤erences between the IV and the OLS results. First, the two estimates predict di¤erent dynamics for the impact of an FTA on tari¤ reductions by nonmembers. In contrast to the OLS estimates, the e¤ect implied by the IV estimates is small and not statistically signi…cant in the …rst year of the agreement but is strong and signi…cant in the second, third, and, somewhat surprisingly, …fth years. Second, the magnitude of the IV estimates is larger than the OLS estimates, and the implied responsiveness of MFN tari¤s to changes in preferential export share of an average trade partner is 2-3 times larger with the IV estimates. These results suggest that import shares are indeed endogenous in equation (29), causing a bias in the OLS estimates.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 report results when we treat preferential export shares as endogenous and instrument P XS (T ) variables with IV 2 (T ), discussed in Section 3.2. These instruments not only address the problem of endogeneity of import shares, but also isolate variation in changes in preferential export shares which can be attributed to the e¤ect of FTAs. The results of Angrist-Pischke test indicate strong correlation between our instruments and endogenous regressors in the …rst stage. Of the six coe¢ cients on P XS (T ) variables, two remain negative and statistically signi…cant. Speci…cally, the estimated e¤ect of FTAs on tari¤ reduction by outside countries is the strongest in the second and the third years of an agreement. The magnitude of these coe¢ cients is also considerably larger than that for the estimates obtained from the OLS and GMM with IV 1 (T ) instruments, which is consistent with the presence of attenuation bias in the OLS and GMM with IV 1 (T ) estimates. Since changes in preferential export shares is an imperfect measure of changes in export supply elasticities, noisy data may bias the coe¢ cient estimates towards zero, and isolating variation in P XS (T )
variables which is related to trade agreements and changes in export supply elasticity may improve identi…cation of the e¤ect of our interest.
Similar results are obtained in columns (5) and (6) when we use additional instruments for preferential export shares, IV 3 (T ), constructed from the predicted e¤ect of factor endowments 13 We cannot apply Stock-Yogo weak identi…cation test since the critical values for this test are only available when the number of endogenous regressions does not exceed three. Using the conventional "rule of thumb" by Staiger and Stock (1997) , all F-statistics are close or above 10, suggesting that weak identi…cation is unlikely to be present.
on change in trade volumes between FTA countries. Each IV 3 (T ) is positive and individually signi…cant in the …rst stage regression for the corresponding P XS (T ) at least at 10% con…dence level, and the Hansen-J over-identi…cation test passes easily.
5 Robustness tests and extensions
Political economy
Suppose countries are politically biased and attach an additional weight to the domestic producer surplus relative to the other components of welfare. For simplicity, let all members of a prospective trade agreement have symmetric political preferences, with m denoting their political bias. Let the political bias of non-member country c be denoted by c 1:
We begin by considering a scenario where country z negotiates an FTA with m other countries. Before the FTA is formed (i.e. we are in regime ), the optimal MFN tari¤ of an outside country c on imports from z is denoted by t It is straightforward to show that the formation of an FTA induces non-member countries to reduce their MFN tari¤s:
where ' In order to test whether countries with stronger political preferences in trade policies reduce their tari¤s by more in response to FTA formation by other countries, we need data on political preferences by country. We take these data from Gawande, Krishna, and Olarreaga (2009).
The authors estimate the protection for sale model by Grossman and Helpman (1994) for 51 countries and quantify the extent to which governments are concerned about national welfare relative to rents of special interest groups. Using the estimates of the relative weight that governments attach to welfare over private interests, a, we run several tests for the hypothesis that political preferences lead to stronger response in trade policies to FTA formation.
First, in column (1) of Table 5 we report the estimates of equation (29) augmented with the interactions of P XS (T ) variables with the welfare mindedness of governments, a. If more politically biased governments (higher , lower a) reduce tari¤ by more in response to an increase in P XS (T ), we would expect to …nd positive coe¢ cients on P XS (T ) a variables. The estimates in column 1(b) show that only one of the interactions has a positive and marginally signi…cant coe¢ cient. Next, we estimate the coe¢ cients on P XS (T ) variables separately for countries with high and low values of a using di¤erent percentile thresholds on a to assign countries one of the two groups. Results with three percentile thresholds, in increasing order of a, are presented in Table 5 : the 25th percentile (column 2), the 50th percentile (column 3), and the 75th percentile (column 4). For any given threshold, we include the interactions of P XS (T ) with a dummy variable I c which takes the value of one for countries with a c above the threshold. Only when we consider countries with the lowest political bias (column 4), we …nd that they reduce tari¤s by less in response to an FTA in the third and the …rth year of the agreement. However, insigni…cant coe¢ cients on P XS (T ) I c interactions suggest that trade policies of countries with the highest political biases seem to be equally responsive to FTA formation than other countries (column 2). Similar conclusions are drawn from results in column (5) where we add interactions of P XS (T ) with the quartile dummy variables for a:
countries with high a do not seem to adjust their tari¤s any di¤erent from countries with low a.
Therefore, there is little evidence in the data that the political economy factors is an important determinant of a responsiveness a country's trade policy to FTA formation by other countries.
Results with 4-digit HS data
In Tables 6 and 7 we show that our results are robust at higher level of product disaggregation, albeit weakened. Using 3-and 4-digit HS industry classi…cation, we show that tari¤s respond negatively to an increase in partner countries'preferential trade. The e¤ect is still the strongest in the second and the third years of a trade agreement but the magnitudes are lower with more disaggregated data. The OLS estimates fall nearly by half when we move from 2-digit to 3-digit industry data, although the IV results with full set of instruments are very close between the two classi…cations. The coe¢ cient estimates obtained with the 4-digit data are even smaller but remain highly signi…cant in the second and third years of the agreement, con…rming our previous …ndings that FTAs stimulate other countries to lower their tari¤s.
Trade diversion
While a decrease in exports of FTA partners to the ROW increases export supply elasticity faced by other countries, the FTA market becomes (relatively) less accessible for goods from non-members which may start exporting relatively more to each other. This trade diversion e¤ect of the FTAs and the following increase in trade between non-members will tend to decrease the elasticity of export supply, which may partially o¤set the direct e¤ect of an FTA on nonmember tari¤s. To test the e¤ect of trade diversion on non-member tari¤s, we construct six variables that measure the change in non-member countries'exports to members subsequent to FTA commencement and capture the trade diversion e¤ect:
If FTAs cause trade diversion ( T D (T ) < 0) and de ‡ect trade from non-members to third countries, it would decrease export supply elasticities and increase tari¤s of non-member coun-tries. Hence, we would expect coe¢ cients on T D (T ) variables to be negative. Results in Table 8 show that only when import shares are instrumented, there is a weak evidence in favor of the e¤ect of trade diversion on trade policies of non-member countries. Most importantly, whether instrumented or not, trade diversion variables have small impact on MFN tari¤s and their inclusion does not change the estimates of the P XS (T ) e¤ect.
Additional robustness tests
In this subsection we present additional sensitivity tests and tabulate the key estimates for alternative samples of the data. In the …rst two columns of Table 9 we show that the main result remains qualitatively similar when China is included in the sample. Although rapid increase in
Chinese exports in the last twenty years has a strong negative impact on the average change in preferential export share, this e¤ect does not vary systematically across FTAs and keeping China in the sample does not a¤ect the estimates.
Many recent empirical studies on the term-of-trade e¤ect focus only on the non-WTO member countries because tari¤s of member countries may no longer re ‡ect the terms of trade motive or re ‡ect it only partially (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999) . To test whether trade policies are more responsive to terms-of-trade shocks in the absence of the WTO constraints, we analyze the e¤ect of FTAs on tari¤s of the WTO member and non-member countries separately. Focusing on the OLS results, reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 9 , there seem to be no big di¤er-ence in the estimates for the two groups of countries: while the e¤ect of trade agreements on tari¤s is stronger for non-members in the second year, it is not statistically signi…cant in other years. However, comparing the estimates with instrumental variables in columns (5) and (6) 
Conclusions
We develop a simple theoretical model of endogenous tari¤s with a large number of countries and analyze the e¤ect that the formation of an FTA between a sub-set of them has on the import tari¤s of excluded or non-member countries. This model predicts that an FTA redirects export ‡ows of member countries away from the rest of the world towards each other and thereby reduces the elasticities of export supply curves faced by non-members. As a result, the ability of non-members to manipulate their terms-of-trade via import tari¤s is weakened which, in turn, induces them to lower their MFN tari¤s on FTA members. We show that this trade liberalization e¤ect of an FTA on non-member countries is stronger when the increase in trade ‡ows between members resulting from the agreement is larger.
Bringing this prediction to the data we …nd considerable support for the hypothesis that In conclusion, we wish to emphasize two fundamental points. First, since the evidence presented in this paper shows that the formation of FTAs can cause trade liberalization to spillover to excluded countries, an important welfare gain resulting from their formation has been overlooked. For example, the literature addressing whether FTAs are building or stumbling blocs for multilateral liberalization has tended to focus primarily on how FTA formation a¤ects the incentives of member countries to undertake further liberalization with respect to excluded countries. Our analysis shows that we also need to pay attention to the e¤ects that FTAs might have on trade policies of non-member countries. The second major point to note is that our results provide a rather clean and fairly convincing test of the terms of trade theory of trade agreements since the formation of an FTA between a few countries can be reasonably interpreted as an exogenous event from the perspective of the rest of the world. Thus, the paper makes a contribution to the rapidly emerging empirical literature investigating the underpinnings and the key predictions of the terms of trade theory of trade agreements.
Appendix
In this section, we provide the necessary supporting calculations, proofs, and discussions.
Appendix A. Welfare components and the optimal tari¤
In this section, consistent with the Article XXIV of the GATT, we assume that member countries under an FTA remove their internal tari¤s ( b t g = 0) while imposing external tari¤s on the non-member countries independently. As before, suppose that country z forms an FTA with m countries and country c is a non-member country while c~denotes non-members other than country c. Let F denote the set of FTA member countries. Next, we report individual welfare components for country c. Consumer surplus equals
2 while producer surplus is
Furthermore, tari¤ revenue equals
+ 2n
Under optimal tari¤s, the export supply elasticity " gz c is found as:
Note that the intensive margin is internalized with optimal tari¤s and only extensive margin appears in capturing the preferential export share. The formation of an FTA raises " gz c relative to no agreement and it rises more as the FTA has more members (as the preferential export share rises):
gz c @m > 0. Country c's optimum external tari¤ on good g z is found as follows:
Consistent with the export supply elasticity discussion, we …nd that non-member countries impose lower tari¤s with the formation of an FTA and as the size of the FTA expands (i.e. as the preferential export share of a typical FTA member rises), the result gets stronger:
Appendix B. General demand and supply
In this section, we examine whether the results obtained under a linear demand and supply framework extend to a more general setting. To this end, we make two fairly unobjectionable assumptions: (i) import demand functions are negatively sloped while export supply functions are positively sloped ; (ii) there exist at least one member country exporting good z while at least one other member country and one non-member country (country c) importing good g z . At a given world price, the formation of an FTA increases the preferential export shares of member countries while simultaneously reducing their export supply to all importing nonmember countries. As a result, FTA formation leads to a decrease in x gz zc (p gz z ), shifting it parallel leftward and the equilibrium world price of good g z rises while the equilibrium exports of good g z to country c fall.
14 Note that the larger the volume of preferential trade among FTA members relative to the rest of the world, the greater the magnitude of the leftward shift of x gz zc (p gz z ).
14 The same results would obtain even when the shift is non-parallel as long as there is a greater magnitude of shift at higher prices.
(31) in the model (29). Speci…cally, the variation in the trade-weighted average of the preferential export share of a country's trade partners should re ‡ect the variation in the export supply elasticity. In this Appendix we provide some evidence in support of this assumption. We do so by estimating export supply elasticities for every country-industry pair in our sample for two time periods and relating the change in the elasticity to the observed change in preferential export shares of a country's average trade partner.
We use the approach of Feenstra (1994) and its extension by Broda and Weinstein (2006) to separately identify import demand and export supply elasticities. The presentation here draws heavily on the treatment in Broda and Weinstein (2006) , which can be used for a more detailed reference. The approach is based on the following parametrization of the system of import demand and export supply equations:
where x civt in the …rst equation is the demand for variety v of good i consumed in country c in year t derived from the CES utility function which depends on the price (p civt ), aggregate income (E ct ), the elasticity of substitution between varieties of good i ( ci ), price index for good i ( it ), and the random taste parameter (d civt ). The export supply function depends on the inverse export supply elasticity (! ci ) and the random technology factor ( civt ) assumed to be independent of d civt . Re-writing quantities in (36) in terms of market shares, taking logs, and time di¤erencing yields
where ' it = ( ci 1) ln it = it 1 . In order to eliminate this good-speci…c unobservable term from the demand equation, both equation are di¤erences with respect to a reference country k. Using superscript k to denote the reference di¤erence operator, the system becomes
Solving for the error terms in (37) and multiplying them through, we obtain: Feenstra (1994) demonstrates that equation (38) estimated with the 2SLS for every country and industry using indicator variables for varieties as instruments will produce consistent estimates of 1ci and 2ci . This estimates, b 1ci and b 2ci , can be used to calculate elasticity parameters from
The identi…cation of import demand and export supply elasticities in Feenstra (1994) rests on a number of strong assumptions which make it impossible to use them directly in our work. Most importantly for this study, the estimator is asymptotically consistent as the number of time periods approaches in…nity. Therefore, changes in the elasticities cannot be obtained for every country-industry-year observation in our sample and are proxied by changes in preferential export shares. In order to assess the quality of this proxy we need to obtain a measure of a change in the export supply elasticity that can be related to changes in preferential export shares. We thus proceed by estimating export supply elasticity ! ci for every country-industry pair in two time periods, 1988-2001 and 2002-2011 . Denoting the two periods with T 1 and T 2 , we then calculate the change in the average preferential export share between the two periods and regress it on the change in the inverse export supply elasticity: Table A1 presents estimation results for equation (40) . The coe¢ cient in column (1) is negative and statistically signi…cant at 5% con…dence level. This result implies that, as the theory 17 In this regression we use only observations with b 1ci > 0. We also drop one percent of the observations with the highest and the lowest changes in ! ci in order to minimize the e¤ect of outliers.
predicts, a reduction in the inverse export supply elasticity (increase in the level of the export supply elasticity) is associated with an increase in the preferential export share of a country's trade partners. Adding industry …xed e¤ects in column (2) to control for industry-speci…c trends in preferential trade shares does not a¤ect the results. Column (3) includes country …xed e¤ects to control for country-year speci…c characteristics such as size and the general structure of trade. Results are broadly similar to the basic speci…cation. Finally, in columns (4)- (6) we reestimate equation (40) is smaller than in columns (1)- (3), it becomes statistically signi…cant at 1% con…dence level.
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While the above evidence is consistent with our assumption that changes in preferential export shares re ‡ect changes in the export supply elasticities, these results should be treated with caution. The average number of time periods in the two subsamples are 6.4 and 7.1, respectively, and the estimates of ! ciT 2 and ! ciT 1 may not be very precise. Indeed, Soderbery (2010) show that in samples of that size the estimates of the export supply elasticity are biased upward by more than 60%.
Appendix D. Instrumenting preferential export shares
This appendix provides a detailed description of instruments for preferential export shares used in the estimation. Instrumenting changes in preferential export shares requires IVs which are correlated with the e¤ect of a trade agreement on trade ‡ows between member countries but uncorrelated with either MFN tari¤s of third countries or with the common shocks. Our IV strategy is motivated by Baier and Bergstrand (2004) who constructed a general equilibrium model of trade with two monopolistically competitive industries, two factors of production, six countries, and three continents. Using this model, Baier and Bergstrand identify several factors which contribute to larger e¤ect of an FTA on trade volumes between member countries.
Speci…cally, they …nd that FTAs lead to more trade between member countries when trade partners are 'natural' (i.e. when trade costs between them are low), more remote from the rest of the world, and larger and more similar in size. They also show that FTAs create more trade when the di¤erence in factor endowments is large between member countries and small between members and the rest of the world. As with the instrumental variables strategy for import shares, we begin by focusing on geographic determinants of trade only, and add di¤erences in factor endowments in our analysis later.
To control for trade costs between FTA member countries p and j we use three gravity model variables: logarithm of the bilateral distance (ln D pj ), common border indicator (B pj ), and common language indicator (L pj ). The remoteness measure for a pair of countries p and j with respect to the rest of the world is constructed as the simple average of the log of mean distance of country p to its trade partners except for j and the log of mean distance of country j to its trade partners except for p:
where D pn is the distance between countries p and n and N is the total number of countries.
As in Baier and Bergstrand, we use the interaction of the remoteness measure with the same continent indicator variable (CREM OT E pj ) in order to distinguish intercontinental and intracontinental trade costs. We use the sum of logarithms of two countries'populations as a measure of their economic size (SIZE pj ) and the absolute di¤erence in the logarithms of population of two countries as a measure of size asymmetry (DSIZE pj ).
Because we need instruments for preferential export shares at country-pair-industry-year level while the geography variables do not vary within country pair cells, our point of departure is to estimate the dynamic e¤ect of those variables on trade volumes within an FTA. We allow several years for trade volumes between trade partners to converge to new equilibrium levels after the FTA is established. There are at least two reasons to expect a delayed response of trade ‡ows to FTA formation. First, it may take some time for producers to adjust their production plans and capacities to changes in market conditions. Second, many FTAs do not lead to free trade in the …rst year of the agreement but rather liberalize trade policy gradually by phasingout preferential tari¤ reductions over several years. In the presence of dynamic response of trade ‡ows to FTA formation, we allow for the e¤ect of the instruments for preferential trade shares to be time-speci…c during the …rst …ve years of the agreement.
Let F T A (T ) pjt to be an indicator variable which is equal to one if countries p and j entered an FTA in year (t T ) for T 5. 19 For every industry i we estimate the following regression:
The last category, F T A (6) pjt , aggregates all FTAs formed in years (t 6) and before. where x T pjt = F T A (T ) pjt x pj . Having estimated equation (41) for every industry, we obtain the predicted change in the preferential export share between years t and (t T ) for every country-pair, industry and year, \ T exp_share pjit .
Three points about equation (41) need to be emphasized. First, allowing for the e¤ect of FTAs to be dynamic generates variation in \ T exp_share pjit over time. Second, with the coef…cients on the right-hand side variables varying by industry we obtain cross-industry variation in the predicted preferential trade shares even though the variation in geography variables in (41) is by country-pair. To develop intuition for this approach, consider the distance variable.
We know that the e¤ect of an FTA on trade ‡ows depends on trade costs and is decreasing in distance. Our earlier results also show that the e¤ect of distance and other gravity model measures of trade costs vary across industries. Therefore, we would expect the e¤ect of FTA on trade to be stronger in those industries where transportation costs and distance play lesser role. The relevance of variation in coe¢ cients in equation (41) is supported by the fact that 65% of variation in \ T exp_share pjit is coming from the variation within country-pair-year cells and 51% is coming from the variation within country-pair-industry cells. Lastly, we are not trying to predict changes in preferential trade between countries which are not members of any preferential trade agreement. For this reason, equation (41) is estimated only for country pairs which were part of an FTA in year (t 1), i.e. we only use observations for which the dependent variable is di¤erent from zero.
Using the model (41), we reject the null that trade costs, remoteness, and size variables have no e¤ect on changes in preferential export shares for 94 industries out of 97 at 1% con…dence level. For the remaining 3 industries the explanatory variables in (41) are jointly signi…cant at 5%. The mean F-statistics for the test k iT = 0 8k = 1; ::7 is 9:26, the mean R-square is 0:21, and the correlation between predicted and actual preferential trade shares is 0:31. These results suggest that trade costs, remoteness, and the level and asymmetry in population of two countries can be used to predict the e¤ect of an FTA on preferential trade shares. Using these geographic characteristics of a pair of FTA member countries allows us to construct a measure of preferential trade shares which are plausibly independent from trade policies of third countries.
Our second instrument for T exp_share pjit isolates variation in preferential export shares stemming from di¤erences in factor endowments across FTA member states. Baier and Bergstrand's model predicts that FTAs create more trade when the di¤erence in factor endowments is large between member countries. Using this insight, we modify equation (41) as follows:
where K pjt is the di¤erence in physical capital endowments of countries p and j at time t, H pjt is the di¤erence in human capital endowments, and P M pjit is the preference margin de…ned as the di¤erence between the MFN tari¤ of country p and the preferential tari¤ that country p applies to imports from country j. We also include interactions of K pjt and H pjt with the importer's preference margin to capture the possibility that factor endowment di¤erences may have stronger impact on trade when tari¤ concessions are deeper. Using the estimates from equation (42) we construct two sets of instruments, IV 2 (T ) and IV 3 (T ), which isolate geographic factor endowment determinants of changes in preferential export shares:
Data on country's stock of physical capital, measured in constant 2005 prices, is retrieved from the Penn World Table. Human capital stock is obtained from Barro and Lee (2013) and is measured as a share of population with secondary and tertiary education. Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the MFN tariff between years t and (t-1). * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country-industry level. Observations with more than 10% changes in MFN tariff are excluded from the analysis. Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the MFN tariff between years t and (t-1). * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country-industry level. Observations with more than 10% changes in MFN tariff are excluded from the analysis. In columns (a) and (b) the explanatory variables are constructed over positive and negative changes in preferential export shares, respectively. All specifications include tariff reciprocity variables as additional controls. Table 4 . IV results Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the MFN tariff between years t and (t-1). * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country-industry level. Observations with more than 10% changes in MFN tariff are excluded from the analysis. All specifications include country-year and country-industry fixed effects. a is the weight attached by a government to national welfare relative to welfare of special interest groups. Ii is the binary variable which takes the value of one for countries with a greater than i-th centile. Di is the binary variable which takes the value of one for countries with a falling into i-th quartile. Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the MFN tariff between years t and (t-1). * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country-industry level. Observations with more than 10% changes in MFN tariff are excluded from the analysis. Table 7 . IV results with 4-digit HS product data _________________HS3__________________ ________________HS4_______________ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the MFN tariff between years t and (t-1). * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country-industry level. Observations with more than 10% changes in MFN tariff are excluded from the analysis. Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the MFN tariff between years t and (t-1). * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country-industry level. Observations with more than 10% changes in MFN tariff are excluded from the analysis. All specifications include country-year and country-industry fixed effects. Low (high) income countries are those with the income per capita below (above) the sample median in 2000. Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are clustered by country. 
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